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GUILTY PLEA COLLOQUIES: LET THE RECORD
SHOW...
Mary Kay Wheeler
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, ninety-two percent of the criminal convictions in
Montana were obtained via guilty pleas.1 Many guilty plea convic-
tions, however, are later challenged through the direct appeal pro-
cess or post-conviction procedures.2 Many of those appeals present
"colorable" claims, i.e., new issues with arguable merit that the
Montana Supreme Court has not directly addressed.
A 1977-78 survey conducted by the Montana Attorney Gen-
eral's Office showed that the information the accused received from
the court when entering a guilty plea varied with each judge.3
Many appellate claims could be avoided, and criminal defendants
could be assured of receiving an equal and adequate amount of in-
formation, if some form of "standard" guilty plea colloquy were
adopted. A standard colloquy would assist the court in making an
on-the-record assessment that meets the constitutional require-
ments for a valid guilty plea. It would also eliminate the need for
expensive post-conviction review of possibly frivolous claims.
The purpose of this comment is to propose a standard collo-
quy checklist. This comment will discuss: (1) the minimum re-
quirements under the federal Constitution; (2) the statutory
framework and case law used in Montana to determine whether a
guilty plea is constitutionally valid; (3) the importance of certain
information that, although not required, ought to be received by
each criminal defendant; and (4) topics that should uniformly be
covered by each court before acceptance of a guilty plea.
1. Montana State Judicial Information System, Annual Report For 1982-Caseload
Statistics (available from Montana Supreme Court Administrator).
2. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 478 (1981) provides:
Questions as to whether an accused was sufficiently informed of the conse-
quences of a guilty plea before making such a plea may be raised by a motion to
withdraw that plea, by a direct attack on a judgment or order by appeal or writ of
error, or by various forms of collateral attack such as in habeas corpus, coram
nobis, or motion under statutes.
3. Montana Attorney General Office, Guilty Plea Survey (1977-78) (unpublished infor-
mal survey).
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II. REQUISITES FOR A GUILTY PLEA UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
A. Voluntariness and Understanding Must be Demonstrated in
the Record
In Kercheval v. United States,4 a 1927 case, the United States
Supreme Court enunciated the constitutional standard for a valid
guilty plea. The Court held that "a plea of guilty shall not be ac-
cepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full
understanding of the consequences." 5 The Court noted that a
guilty plea is a conviction and that nothing else need be done by a
court after entry of a valid guilty plea except to give judgment and
impose a sentence.6 The landmark case setting forth the constitu-
tional necessity for some kind of on the record colloquy when an
accused enters a guilty plea was Boykin v. Alabama. The Court
held that there is reversible error when the record does not disclose
that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his
guilty plea.8
Boykin requires that the accused be addressed personally and
in open court. Because waiver of a constitutional right usually in-
volves "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege,"" waiver cannot be presumed from a silent rec-
ord.10 The Court noted that several federal rights are waived
through entry of a guilty plea: the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination; the right to trial by jury; and the right to con-
front one's accusers. 11
Because of the express reference to these rights, some courts
have held that a defendant must be informed of these rights as a
constitutional requirement.12 Other courts have ruled that enumer-
ation of these rights is not required by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' 3 Those courts have held that the ap-
4. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
5. Id. at 223. The concept of "understanding" has also been expressed through use of
the terms "intelligent" and "knowing." Many courts use these terms interchangeably.
6. Id.
7. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
8. Id. at 244.
9. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
10. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
11. Id.
12. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449 (1969); Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711
(Iowa 1974); McCall v. State, 9 Md. App. 191, 263 A.2d 19 (1970); People v. Jaworski, 387
Mich. 21, 194 N.W.2d 868 (1972); Smith v. Oklahoma City, 513 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1973).
18. State v. Phillips, 108 Ariz. 332, 498 P.2d 199 (1972); Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300
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plicable standard is set forth in North Carolina v. Alford,14 i.e.,
whether the guilty plea represents an intelligent and voluntary
choice. The Boykin Court concluded:
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment de-
mands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in can-
vassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.
When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record ade-
quate for any review that may be later sought ... and forestalls
the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky
memories."
The Court's direction that lower courts exercise the "utmost
solicitude" sets a high standard. Waiver standards in the guilty
plea context are justifiably set high, however, for a guilty plea is a
waiver of the whole "bundle of rights" the accused has. Brief and
cursory colloquies, therefore, do not meet the standard set forth in
Boykin.
Lower courts, both state and federal, have struggled to define
the voluntariness and understanding requirements in various fac-
tual situations. Rule 11 of the federal rules of criminal procedure's
provides a procedure to guarantee that a minimum amount of in-
formation is given each criminal defendant in federal court. In Mc-
Carthy v. United States,'7 the Supreme Court held that these pro-
cedures must be followed in federal court in order to ensure that a
plea is voluntary. Failure properly to follow those procedures gives
the defendant the right to plead anew. 8 State courts, however, are
not bound by the federal rules of criminal procedure.' 9 They have,
therefore, looked to the United States Supreme Court for further
(Fla. 1973); People v. Reeves, 50 Ill. 2d 28, 276 N.E.2d 318 (1971); State v. Reed, 187 Neb.
792, 194 N.W.2d 179 (1972); Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 516 P.2d 1403 (1973); State v.
Piacella, 27 Ohio St. 2d 92, 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971); Raisley v. Sullivan, 8 Or. App. 332, 493
P.2d 745 (1972); Miracle v. Peyton, 211 Va. 123, 176 S.E.2d 339 (1970); Edwards v. State, 51
Wis. 2d 231, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971).
14. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
15. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44 (citations omitted).
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) requires that "[blefore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him
of, and determine that he understands," the nature of the charge and its minimum and
maximum penalties, the right to representation, the right to plead not guilty, the right to a
jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
possibility that statements made during the plea interrogation may later be used against
him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
17. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
18. Id. at 472.
19. Brown v. Crist, 492 F. Supp. 965, afj'd, 654 F.2d 728, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087
(1980).
19841
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definition of the voluntariness and understanding requirements.
B. Voluntariness
A guilty plea induced by some form of coercion, threat, intimi-
dation, deception, or trick is not voluntary.20 In Brady v. United
States," the Supreme Court adopted the standard of the Fifth
Circuit in Shelton v. United States22 as to voluntariness of guilty
pleas:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct conse-
quences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand un-
less induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper har-
assment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature im-
proper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's busi-
ness (e.g. bribes).2
Promises made by state or federal officials to encourage the
defendant to plead guilty to criminal charges, while not in and of
themselves sufficient to invalidate the plea, are taken into account
in the voluntariness determination.2 4 Until relatively recently, plea
bargaining and plea agreements were often not acknowledged in
open court.2 5 In Brady the Supreme Court discussed the plea bar-
gaining process and sustained the constitutionality of the prac-
tice.26 The Court found that Brady's guilty plea was not compelled
20. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
21. Id.
22. 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
23. 246 F.2d at 572 n.2 (emphasis added).
24. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-55. See also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 793
(1970), where the record showed that the defendant was asked: "Has anybody made you any
promise or forced you in any way to make this plea?" and "Has any person promised you
anything if you do this?" The court held that where the record showed that the defendant
answered in the negative, this was evidence that no coercion was exercised. But compare
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) with State v. Sather, 172 Mont. 428, 564 P.2d
1306 (1977) (conflicting views on the constitutionality of somewhat heavy-handed plea
bargaining).
25. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS] § 14-3.1
commentary (1980) states:
Even judges who were aware of such agreements frequently acted as if they
did not exist. It was not uncommon, for example, for defendants to plead guilty,
declaring to the court that no promises of any kind had been made, despite knowl-
edge by all the parties that the prosecutor had agreed to dismiss certain charges or
to recommend a particular sentence in return for the guilty plea.
26. 397 U.S. at 751-52. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971), the Su-
preme Court stated that plea bargaining is "an essential component of the administration of
[criminal] justice."
298 [Vol. 45
4
ontana Law Review, Vol. 45 [1984], ss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/6
GUILTY PLEA COLLOQUIES
or invalid because it was motivated by his desire to accept the cer-
tainty or probability of a lesser penalty.2 7
Other Supreme Court decisions have discussed the contours of
the voluntariness requirement. Several decisions have discussed
the "factual basis" inquiry2S-i.e., questioning the defendant for
admission of sufficient facts to form a judgment that the defendant
is, in fact, guilty of the offense charged. While endorsing this in-
quiry, the Supreme Court has not squarely held that a factual ba-
sis is required to satisfy due process requirements. In North Caro-
lina v. Alford,2e the Court held that the defendant's guilty plea was
voluntary, notwithstanding the fact that he testified he was inno-
cent. The Court has also held that a prior coerced confession must
be shown to have an "enduring effect" on the guilty plea in order
for the plea to be involuntary.30
In assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the Supreme
Court has noted the importance of effective assistance of counsel."'
A guilty plea entered without counsel or without valid waiver of
counsel is constitutionally invalid.32
C. Understanding
The understanding requirement has been a fertile source of
litigation since Boykin. The Supreme Court has focused on three
factors in determining whether the guilty plea is constitutionally
"intelligent": (1) the competency of the accused at the entry of the
plea; (2) the accused's understanding of the "nature of the
charges"; and (3) the accused's understanding of the "conse-
quences of the plea."
A defendant must have a minimum mental capacity or compe-
tency to enter a guilty plea. 3 In Brady, the Court found that the
27. While the Court upheld the validity of Brady's guilty plea, it carefully distin-
guished the facts of the case before it from "improper" bargaining: "We here make no refer-
ence to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately employ their
charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty."
Brady, 397 U.S. at 751.
28. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 240; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 462-63; Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38.
A majority of state courts now require that some form of factual basis be established. See J.
BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 3.54(a) (1982).
29. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). In Alford the court stated: "In view of the strong factual basis
for the plea demonstrated by the State and Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it
despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that the trial judge did not commit
constitutional error in accepting it." Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
30. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970).
31. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 569-71 (1970).
32. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945).
33. Brady, 397 U.S. at 756 (noting that nothing in the record indicated that the ac-
cused was not competent). See also Frame v. Hudspeth, 309 U.S. 632 (1940) (remand or-
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defendant possessed sufficient understanding because he "was ad-
vised by competent counsel, he was made aware of the nature of
the charge against him, and there was nothing to indicate that he
was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental facul-
ties . . . ."" A conviction of an accused person while he is legally
incompetent violates due process."
An accused must also be informed of the "nature of the
charges" in order to enter an intelligent guilty plea. 6 In Paterno v.
Lyons,37 the Supreme Court discussed whether the defendant was
given sufficient notice of the charges. The defendant was charged
with larceny, but pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of receiving
stolen goods. The Court concluded that there was sufficient "basis
for an intelligent decision to plead guilty. 3 8
A guilty plea is an admission of all elements of a formal crimi-
nal charge. Therefore it cannot be truly voluntary unless the de-
fendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts.8 Although the Supreme Court has not required that a defen-
dant be informed of all elements of a crime in order for his plea to
be voluntary and understanding, in Henderson v. Morgan" the
Court held that intent was such an essential element of the crime
charged that the defendant had to be informed of this element in
order to have adequate notice of the charges.
A defendant must also understand the "consequences of his
plea."'" Many lower courts, relying on Brady, have attempted to
distinguish between "direct" consequences, of which the accused
must be informed in order to enter a valid guilty plea, and "colat-
eral" consequences.'2 Courts have determined that, at a minimum,
dered for the purpose of full inquiry into the defendant's competency at the entry of the
guilty plea); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (mental incapacity of the defendant
would suggest "fundamental unfairness").
34. Brady, 397 U.S. at 756 (emphasis added).
35. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961
(1956).
36. Brady, 397 U.S. at 756.
37. 334 U.S. 314 (1948).
38. Id. at 321-22.
39. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
40. 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976).
41. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44.
42. See, e.g., Frachtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895
(1976) (possibility of deportation held to be a collateral consequence); Trujillo v. United
States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899 (1967) (holding that ineligibility
for parole is a remote contingency of which the defendant need not be informed). But see
Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969), where the court held that parole
ineligibility is not a collateral consequence because it involves the length of time a defen-
dant is to be incarcerated.
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the defendant must be informed of the maximum possible sen-
tence for the crime charged."'
Without a definitive statement from the Supreme Court as to
which consequences the defendant must be informed of in order to
enter a valid guilty plea, and not bound by the strictures of the
federal rules of criminal procedure, state decisions on this issue
have varied widely. Some states have looked to the federal rules or
other recognized standards to define their guilty plea colloquies. 44
Others have adopted uniform court rules in order to standardize
practice among judicial districts. 45 Montana has responded by en-
acting statutes incorporating the constitutional standards. 46 Those
statutes, as well as the judicial interpretation of them, comprise
the basic legal framework for asserting or challenging the validity
of a guilty plea at the present time.
III. MONTANA REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID GUILTY PLEA
A. Statutory Framework
Several Montana statutes set forth the information a defen-
dant must be given in order to enter a valid guilty plea. The court
is required to advise the defendant of the nature of the charges
against him, 7 the punishment for the crime charged, 8 the right to
counsel,4 the right to "reasonable" time to enter a plea,50 and the
right to secure bail. 1 The court or clerk must deliver a copy of the
information to the defendant, along with a list of the witnesses
against the defendant.52 The information must be read to the de-
43. See, e.g., In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449 (1969); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d
542 (Iowa 1969); State v. Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969); Smith v. Oklahoma
City, 513 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1973).
44. See Comment, Profile of a Guilty Plea: A Proposed Trial Court Procedure For
Accepting Guilty Pleas, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1195 (1971).
45. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970).
46. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-202(1)(a) (1983).
48. Id. § 46-12-202(1)(b) (1983). See also State v. Lewis, 177 Mont. 474, 582 P.2d 346
(1978); In re Davis, 179 Mont. 196, 587 P.2d 30 (1978); State v. Maldonado, 176 Mont. 322,
578 P.2d 296 (1978) (failure to inform the defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence
held not to affect the voluntariness of the guilty plea); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-105(1)(b)
(1983).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-202(I)(c) (1983). See also State v. Doty, 173 Mont. 233,
237, 566 P.2d 1388, 1391 (1977) (absence of counsel is "a factor" to be considered in assess-
ing voluntariness).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-12-202(I)(d), -203 (1983).
51. Id. § 46-12-202(I)(e).
52. Id. § 46-12-202(2)(a).
1984]
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fendant unless he waives its reading.53 The court cannot accept a
guilty plea without first determining that the plea is voluntary,
with an understanding of the charge.5 4 A guilty plea may be ac-
cepted when a defendant enters a guilty plea in open court 55 and
the court has informed the defendant of the "consequences" 56 of
his plea and of the maximum penalty that may be imposed.57 The
court must determine if the defendant is under any disability" and
if the defendant's true name is other than the one used in the
charge.59
B. Montana Case Law
An examination of recent case law reveals that many criminal
defendants have challenged the adequacy of the interrogation at
the entry of the plea. In State v. Lewis" the Montana Supreme
Court examined the adequacy of the arraignment interrogation of
the defendant. The court concluded:
when in the sentencing procedure, the District Court carefully, as
here, examines the defendant, finds him to be competent, and de-
termines from him that his plea of guilty is voluntary, he under-
stands the charge and his possible punishment, he is not acting
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, he admits his counsel is
competent and he has been well advised, and he declares in open
court the facts upon which his guilt is based, then a plea of guilty
accepted by the District Court on the basis of that examination
will be upheld .. 6'
It is important to note that the court in Lewis did not expressly
hold that all of this information, or indeed, any particular kind of
information was necessary for the colloquy to be constitutionally
sufficient. The Lewis opinion does, however, constitute at least an
endorsement of this type of information.
The Montana Supreme Court set forth a three-part test to be
applied to appeals challenging the validity of a guilty plea in State
53. Id. § 46-12-202(2)(b).
54. Id. § 46-12-204(2).
55. Id. § 46-12-201(1).
56. The use of the term "consequences" in § 46-16-105(1)(b), without specific delinea-
tion of what that term means, has led many criminal defendants to challenge the validity of
their guilty pleas. A standard guilty plea inquiry will help to define this vague term.
57. See supra note 48.
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-201(3) (1983).
59. Id. § 46-12-201(2).
60. 177 Mont. 474, 582 P.2d 346 (1978).
61. Id. at 485, 582 P.2d at 352.
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v. Huttinger6 2 The three factors are: (1) the adequacy of the inter-
rogation at the entry of the guilty plea; (2) the promptness with
which the defendant attempts to withdraw the prior plea; and (3)
whether the defendant's plea was the result of a plea bargain. In
a later case the court referred to the test set forth in Huttinger,
and held it was not just the record at the entry of the plea which is
examined to determine the validity of the plea. The record as a
whole is examined in assessing the plea's validity.
The court enunciated the standard for determining whether a
plea is constitutionally valid in Yother v. State.6 5 The standard is
"whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant as
affirmatively disclosed by the record."6 The Yother court sug-
gested that courts and counsel look to Huttinger and Lewis for
guidance in determing what the defendant should be informed of
in entering a guilty plea.
The principles of Huttinger, Lewis, and Yother provide the
basic framework for determining the validity of guilty pleas in
Montana. The court has elsewhere further defined the scope of the
court's duty as well as that of defense counsel. In State v. Nel-
son,6 7 the court held the trial court's interrogation was inadequate
where the court did not make the defendant aware of the distinct
elements of the crime charged. In order for an accused to have an
adequate understanding of the nature of the charges, he must be
informed of any lesser included offenses. 8 The duty to inform the
defendant about possible defenses and mitigating factors is defense
counsel's, however, and not the court's. 9
The trial court is not required to articulate a defendant's spe-
cific rights, but an "in depth examination" is desirable, and may in
some circumstances be mandatory.70 In State v. Haynie,71 the
court stated that whether the defendant was informed that consti-
tutional rights were waived by a guilty plea was a factor to be con-
sidered in determining the validity of the defendant's waiver of
those rights. Thus the better practice in Montana is to inform the
62. 182 Mont. 50, 595 P.2d 363 (1979).
63. Id. at 54, 595 P.2d at 366.
64. State v. Myers, - Mont. - , 627 P.2d 860, 961 (1981).
65. 182 Mont. 351, 597 P.2d 79 (1979).
66. Id. at 358, 597 P.2d at 83.
67. - Mont. __, 603 P.2d 1050 (1979).
68. State v. Azure, 175 Mont. 189, 573 P.2d 179 (1977).
69. State v. Day, - Mont. __, 635 P.2d 568 (1981).
70. Yother, 182 Mont. at 358-359, 597 P.2d at 83.
71. - Mont. - , 607 P.2d 1128, 1130 (1980).
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defendant of the constitutional rights waived, although it is not
always constitutionally necessary.
Other case law and statutes further define the Montana re-
quirements for a valid guilty plea. The state must give written no-
tice to the defendant prior to the entry of the guilty plea of its
intent to treat him as a persistent felony offender.7 2 Failure to in-
form the defendant of the minimum sentence does not affect the
voluntariness of the plea.7- The court has not faced the issue of
whether the defendant must be told that a guilty plea waives the
right to evidentiary objections. In Petition of Ebeling 4 and State
v. Turcotte,75 the court held that a plea of guilty conditioned upon
reservation of right to appeal an adverse decision on suppression of
evidence was an attempt to create a procedure for which there was
no statutory authority. The defendant has to plead not guilty and
stand trial to preserve the objection.
In the recent case of State v. Cavanaugh,76 the Montana Su-
preme Court held that the defendant's guilty plea was not valid
because he was not told that his sentence might include a restric-
tion on eligibility for parole or participation in the prison furlough
program. The court held that this was a consequence of which the
defendant must be informed." Influenced by Santobello v. New
York, 78 the court also enunciated a "fairness" element to be in-
cluded with the voluntary and knowing requirements. In State v.
Hendricks,79 the court cited Cavanaugh for a holding that "it
would be fundamentally unfair not to allow the defendant to with-
draw his guilty plea under circumstances where the District Court
refuses to accept the concessions granted by the State in a plea
bargain agreement." Most recently, in State v. Wilkenson,80 the
court held that the Cavanaugh holding applies only to sentencing
after the date of that decision.
The above cases make it clear that the "rule" in Montana for
what is necessary for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid is
the standard found in Yother. The Yother standard essentially re-
iterates the Boykin v. Alabama requirements, with three modifica-
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-503(1) (1983); State v. Welling, - Mont. - , 647
P.2d 852 (1982).
73. See supra note 48.
74. 143 Mont. 298, 387 P.2d 302 (1963).
75. 164 Mont. 426, 524 P.2d 787 (1974).
76. - Mont. -, P.2d - (1983).
77. Id. at, P.2d at .
78. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
79. - Mont. , P.2d -, (1984).
80. __ Mont. - P.2d - (1984).
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tions in its application. First, the Montana court looks to the rec-
ord as a whole, whereas in Boykin constitutional validity is
assessed from the record at the entry of the plea. Second, the court
considers whether the guilty plea was the result of a plea bargain
in assessing voluntariness and understanding. Third, the court has
applied a timeliness requirement for challenges to the validity of a
guilty plea." Additionally, Cavanaugh and subsequent decisions
indicate that the court is applying a concept of "fundamental fair-
ness" to the proceedings.
IV. POLIcY REASONS FOR USING A STANDARD COLLOQUY
A. Enhancing the Integrity of Courts
An informal survey conducted by the Montana Attorney Gen-
eral's Office in 1977-788' queried district court judges about what
information they give defendants prior to the entry of a guilty
plea. The responses indicated that practices varied from judge to
judge. Due to this lack of consistency and the application of a "to-
tality of circumstances" test on review, not all criminal defendants
are equally apprised of their rights and of the consequences of
their pleas.
Language in Boykin directing lower courts to use the "utmost
solicitude" in canvassing the matter with the accused at the time
of entry of the guilty plea indicates the depth of inquiry envisioned
by the Supreme Court. Indeed, commentators have long argued
that superficial colloquies are insufficient. William Thompson, a
judge in Kanawha County, West Virginia, suggested as far back as
1960 that the best way to protect convictions and the reputation of
the courts was to safeguard the rights of the defendant. Judge
Thompson wrote:
Of course, we are cognizant of the fact that men under long peni-
tentiary sentences want out. With abundant opportunity for re-
flection on how to get out, they will imagine and invent all sorts
of spurious charges concerning the denial of constitutional rights.
Conceivably these people can create serious problems in the ad-
ministration of criminal law. We, as state trial judges, can, by fol-
lowing precautions, have an effective means of protecting our-
selves from such false or unfounded charges, and at the same
time safeguard the constitutional rights and interests of a
81. State v. Huttinger, 182 Mont. 50, 598 P.2d 363 (1979).
82. See supra note 3.
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defendant."
The "effective means" is to build a solid and comprehensive
record at the entry of the plea that will withstand any review.
Judge Thompson noted that "no judge can take pride in holding
his procedure to the very minimum of fairness as required by the
law. After all, we are dealing primarily here with constitutional
guarantees and the life and liberty of an individual is involved. '84
B. A Standard Colloquy Makes Sense From Both Defense and
Prosecution Perspectives
A more comprehensive guilty plea inquiry, uniformly given to
all criminal defendants, makes good practice from both the defense
and prosecution perspectives. A standard inquiry would provide an
opportunity for equal understanding by every defendant of the
rights being waived and the consequences of his plea. The ac-
cused's understanding should not be dependent upon the experi-
ence or personal philosophy of the individual judge, or the exigen-
cies of the court calendar on the particular date of the plea.
A more comprehensive inquiry also makes sense from the
prosecution's perspective. Convictions obtained on the basis of
such inquiries are more likely to withstand appellate review. The
defendant will be unable to assert more than a patently frivolous
claim that the plea was involuntary or without understanding
where the court has meticulously assessed the defendant's under-
standing, and the voluntary and understanding nature of the plea
is affirmatively set forth in the record. As noted earlier, 85 over
ninety percent of recent criminal convictions in Montana were ob-
tained via guilty pleas. Waiver of evidentiary objections and the
absence of trial proceedings on which to allege error leave little
basis for the allegation of error once the validity of the plea is up-
held. A defendant challenging the validity of his plea bears the ini-
tial burden of demonstrating that his plea was constitutionally in-
valid.86 Where a thorough inquiry is found in the record, strong
83. Thompson, The Judge's Responsibility on a Plea of Guilty, 62 W. VA. L. REV. 213,
220 (1960).
84. Id. at 222.
85. See supra note 1.
86. See J. BOND, supra note 28, § 7.11:
The defendant bears the burden of proof on a withdrawal motion. He must show
some plausible reason that justifies withdrawal of his plea. . . . [T]he defendant
who wishes to withdraw his plea of guilty must demonstrate good cause to do so,
or else he fails to sustain his burden of proof.
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-105(2) (1983): "At any time before or after judgment
the court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of
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evidence in the nature of a presumption is established as to the
validity of the plea."7
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice
(ABA Standards) set forth an example of a comprehensive inquiry
at the entry of the plea, as well as a supporting rationale.88 This
rationale is a rich source of policy arguments for challenging guilty
pleas that are mere perfunctory assessments. The objective of the
standards is "to formulate procedures that will maximize the bene-
fits of conviction without trial and minimize the risks of unfair or
inaccurate results."8 9 This objective serves the best interests of
both the defense and prosecution.
V. RECURRENT SPECIAL ISSUES
Certain issues are frequently litigated in challenges to the va-
lidity of guilty pleas. The discussion that follows will: (1) identify
those issues; (2) discuss the policies supporting inclusion of infor-
mation relating to these issues in the guilty plea colloquy; (3) dis-
cuss recommendations by commentators and other noted authori-
ties; and (4) suggest a recommended inquiry regarding each issue.
A. Competency Inquiries
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that a person pleading guilty must be competent.90 In order to de-
termine the competency of the defendant, the court must make
some initial inquiries as to the defendant's identity-name, age,
address, marital status. Where the defendant is young, unfamiliar
with the English language, lacking in education, or of low intelli-
gence, those factors should be considered by the court in assessing
the depth of inquiry necessary to assure that the guilty plea is vol-
untary and understanding.
Competency is established on the record by questioning the
defendant regarding any prior mental illness or drug or alcohol de-
not guilty substituted."
87. J. BOND, supra note 28, § 7.10 states:
There is a strong presumption that a guilty plea is valid, particularly where the
judge states that the defendant has been advised of all his legal and constitutional
rights and of the consequences of his plea, and the defendant is represented by
counsel. Moreover, the accuracy and truth of the defendant's statements at-plea-
taking are "conclusively" established unless and until he makes a reasonable alle-
gation to the contrary. . . . In such circumstances bald assertions of irregularity
will simply not overcome the presumption of regularity.
88. ABA STANDARDS ch. 14 appendix.
89. Id. ch. 14, at 5.
90. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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pendency, and health and mental status at the entry of the plea.
This prevents collateral attack on this basis at a later time. Virtu-
ally all authorities recommend that some degree of inquiry into
competency take place at the entry of the plea, with variation only
as to the particular inquiries.91 The recommended practice for es-
tablishing competency on the record is to inquire regarding the de-
fendant's age, amount of formal education, work experiences, pre-
sent health, and any history of mental illness or drug or alcohol
addiction.
B. Informing the Defendant of the Nature of the Charges
A guilty plea cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.9 2 As
the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, "[Rleal no-
tice of the true nature of the charge ... [is] the first and most
universally recognized requirement of due process." 93 While a
court is not able to assess the subjective understanding of the de-
fendant, it is possible to set forth an affirmative inquiry informing
the defendant (on the record) of the charges against him, the ele-
ments of the charge, and his responses to inquiries as to his under-
standing of the charges. This inquiry should encompass lesser in-
cluded offenses, and the elements of those charges. 4 The ABA
Standards recommend that the defendant be informed of both the
nature of the charges and the elements of the offense to which the
defendant pleads guilty:
An explanation of the elements of the charge helps to assure that
the defendant fully appreciates the nature of the offense to which
the plea is tendered. Since a guilty plea is a formal admission of
all elements of the charge, a defendant, in fairness, should be for-
mally advised of the elements before the plea ig accepted.95
Courts, therefore, are encouraged to inquire whether the de-
fendant has a copy of the charges. The defendant should be in-
structed to hold a copy of the charges during the inquiry so that he
may refer to them if he so desires. The court should read the infor-
mation to the defendant, unless the defendant or his attorney
waives reading of the same. The court should then explain the
91. See J. BOND, supra note 28, § 3.30(a)-(c). A judge should be particularly alert for
incoherence at the plea-taking, prior history of mental illness, prior determination of incom-
petency, and evidence that defendant is being treated for chronic mental illness. Id.
92. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
93. Brady, 397 U.S. at 756.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
95. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.4(a)(i) commentary.
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charges and elements of the offense(s) to the defendant, including
elements of lesser offenses.
C. Inquiry Into the Factual Basis of the Charge
Although several Supreme Court decisions have discussed the
"factual basis" requirement, 6 none have squarely held that this is
required to satisfy due process requirements. A factual basis, how-
ever, serves many important purposes. It assures that a defendant
is in fact guilty. Establishment of a factual basis decreases the risk
of an innocent person being convicted. It also eliminates the neces-
sity for post-conviction fact-finding proceedings to determine the
accuracy of the guilty plea. The factual basis is also often useful to
the court at sentencing.'
As one commentator has observed, the voluntariness and fac-
tual basis requirements are inextricably linked.' 8 Virtually all
model provisions recommend that a factual basis be established. In
light of Montana Supreme Court decisions endorsing this prac-
tice," as well as the important purposes the factual basis serves,
this should be included in the standard inquiry.
The recommended practice is to have the defendant establish
the factual basis by telling the story in his own words. The court
should first inform the defendant of the right against self-incrimi-
nation; inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives
that right; have the defendant waive the right; and then have the
defendant testify regarding the factual basis. The court must de-
termine, after listening to the factual basis, whether the facts testi-
fied to by the defendant constitute the offense charged.
Some judicial districts in Montana use a written acknowledge-
ment of waiver of rights that also contains the factual basis of the
offense.100 The practice of using a written waiver is recommended
because it presents another opportunity for the accused to set
forth his version of the offense. It also gives him another occasion
to consider the seriousness of the action he is taking in entering a
guilty plea. While such written waiver forms are useful as a check-
list and serve to emphasize for a defendant his .constitutional
rights, their use should not be regarded as a substitute for a verba-
96. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
97. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.6(a) commentary.
98. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary
Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88 (1977).
99. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 177 Mont. 474, 582 P.2d 346 (1978).
100. See supra note 3.
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tim transcript of the plea proceedings.10'
D. Informing the Defendant of the Maximum Possible
Sentence and Other Related Matters
The defendant must be informed of the maximum penalty
that may be imposed for the offense charged. The defendant's pri-
mary concern is the possible length of the sentence. Virtually all
model provisions agree that the defendant should be advised of the
maximum possible sentence, as well as any mandatory minimum
sentence.02
Many issues have been raised on appeal, however, as to what
constitutes the maximum possible sentence. The ABA Standards
set forth a specific guideline as to information that should be in-
cluded: "As used in this standard, the 'maximum possible sen-
tence' includes punishment possible by virtue either of the sen-
tence provisions of the state under which the charge is brought or
of other statutes that authorize added penalties because of special
circumstances in the case."' 03 The ABA Standards also provide: "A
defendant should be told of any possible added punishment under
multiple offender statutes."' 4
In view of these standards defining maximum possible punish-
ment, the defendant should be informed about other Montana
statutes that may affect the punishment imposed. Admittedly, a
defendant cannot be informed of every remote possibility regard-
ing the punishment imposed. The ABA Standards, however, pre-
sent a comprehensive and well-reasoned approach as to where the
line should be drawn in regard to informing the defendant as to
the possible penalty. In addition to the maximum punishment pro-
vided by statute for the offense charged, the defendant should be
informed that an additional mandatory penalty is provided for of-
fenses committed with a weapon, 0 5 and that the mandatory pen-
alty increases for persons twice convicted of an armed offense.'0 6
The defendant should be informed that these additional punish-
101. ABA STANDARDS, § 14-1.7 commentary. See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 71 (1977), where the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's execution of a standard
printed guilty plea form did not foreclose collateral attack in a postconviction proceeding,
where there was no record of the entry of the guilty plea.
102. ABA STANDARDS § 18-6.5(b)(iii); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
350.4(1) (1975); FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(c); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, Courts 3.7
(1973); UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 444(b) (1974).
103. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.4(a)(ii) commentary.
104. Id. § 14.1-4(a)(iii) commentary.
105. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-221(1) (1983).
106. See id. § 46-18-221(2).
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ments are to run consecutively to the sentence provided for the
offense.1"7
The Montana Supreme Court has held that failure to inform
an accused of the mandatory minimum sentence did not affect the
voluntariness of his plea.1"' Although not constitutionally required,
informing the defendant of any mandatory minimum sentence con-
stitutes good policy and therefore good practice. As the comments
to the ABA Standards correctly point out:
Not all the recommended advisements contained in this standard
are constitutional requirements for the acceptance of a valid
guilty plea. But all of the advisements are considered highly de-
sirable from a policy standpoint, as compliance with this standard
will help to assure that the defendant appreciates the significance
of the plea and that once entered the plea will withstand attack
in postconviction proceedings. 109
Other Montana statutory provisions are arguably within the
"special circumstances" of which defendants should be informed.
In light of the Cavanaugh decision, the defendant should be in-
formed of the possible restrictions on eligibility for parole and par-
ticipation in supervised release programs.110 The accused should
also be informed of the consequences of noneligibility for designa-
tion as a nondangerous offender.1 These statutory provisions are
not sentencing enhancement statutes-i.e., they do not allow the
imposition of time beyond the statutory maximum.1 " They may,
however, greatly increase the amount of time actually served, or
significantly affect the defendant's subjective expectations as to
the amount of time he will actually serve.
Montana law also provides that if a defendant is twice con-
victed of deliberate homicide he will, if sufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances are not found, be sentenced to death.113 Therefore, if
the offense charged is deliberate homicide, the court should inform
the defendant of this provision.
Under Montana law, persons designated persistent felony of-
fenders must be imprisoned for at least five years.1 1 4 However, the
state is also required to give written notice to the defendant prior
to the entry of the guilty plea that it intends to seek treatment of
107. See id. § 46-18-221(4).
108. See supra note 48.
109. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.4 commentary.
110. See MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-202(2) (1983).
111. See id. § 46-23-201(1)(a).
112. Cavanaugh v. Crist, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 890, 893 (1980).
113. MoNT. CoDE ANN. §§ 46-18-303, -305 (1983).
114. Id. § 46-18-502.
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the accused as a persistent felony offender." 5 An on the record in-
quiry whether the state intends to seek treatment as a persistent
felony offender and whether written notice has been given estab-
lishes the record as to these issues and, again, eliminates the basis
for later allegation of error.
E. Informing the Defendant of Specific Constitutional Rights
Waived
The defendant should be informed of the specific constitu-
tional rights he is waiving. As noted earlier, waiver of constitu-
tional rights cannot be presumed from a silent record. In order to
show that the rights were known and intentionally forfeited, there
must be positive objective evidence. A colloquy specifically inform-
ing the defendant of these rights and an affirmative act on the part
of the defendant to waive them satisfies the requirement for an
intentional waiver of these rights. A written waiver, along with dis-
cussion of these rights on the record, provides additional evidence
of intentional relinquishment.
The ABA Standards suggest, in addition to the rights specified
in Boykin,"' that the defendant be advised of additional constitu-
tional rights made applicable to the states, e.g. the right to a
speedy trial, the right to insist that proof of guilt be established
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to compulsory process." 7
The defendant should be told of the right to testify at trial to as-
sure that the defendant understands his right to take the witness
stand if he rejects the right to remain silent." 8 If the defendant
has signed a written acknowledgment of waiver of rights, the court
should question the defendant as to his reading, understanding,
and signing of the written waiver.
F. Informing the Defendant of Waiver of Evidentiary
Objections
A guilty plea waives the right to object to illegally seized evi-
dence and to the sufficiency of the charging papers." 9 If the defen-
dant is not apprised by counsel of the strength of the state's case
and the probable admissibility of the evidence against him, he is
not able to make an intelligent choice as to whether to put the
115. Id. § 46-18-503(1).
116. See supra text accompanying note 11.
117. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.4(a)(iv) commentary.
118. Id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 74 & 75.
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state to its proof or to enter a guilty plea.
In Montana, a defendant may not plead guilty reserving the
right to appeal evidentiary issues.120 The ABA Standards note that
"whether or not the right of appeal is available, it is important
that the defendant, prior to pleading guilty, in fairness to the de-
fendant, understand that there is a pretrial right to object to ille-
gally seized evidence. ' 121 The comment also notes that such advice
serves to insulate guilty pleas from attack on grounds of involunta-
riness based on the defendant's fear that illegally seized evidence
could be used against him.1 22 The recommended practice is to in-
form the defendant that a guilty plea waives evidentiary
objections.
G. Voluntariness and Plea Bargain Inquiries
The voluntary nature of the plea must affirmatively appear in
the record. 23 In order to determine that the guilty plea is volun-
tary the court should ask whether the defendant was in any way
threatened, coerced, or pressured into pleading guilty.1' 4 It is also
important that the court inquire whether the guilty plea is a result
of plea bargaining between defense counsel and the prosecuting at-
torney. Where the entire plea agreement is brought forth on the
record at the entry of the guilty plea, the judge is better able to
assess both the defendant's understanding and whether the plea is
truly voluntary. If the plea bargain is not disclosed, the defendant
may keep quiet-i.e., not mention threats, coercion, or circum-
stances rendering his plea involuntary-for fear of "spoiling" the
bargain. The terms of the plea bargain may be the most persuasive
factors in inducing the defendant to plead guilty. Without a thor-
ough understanding of the terms of the bargain, the court does not
have an adequate understanding of the nature of the plea.
The ABA Standards state that "[tihe court should inquire of
the defendant as well as defense counsel concerning possible plea
discussions and plea agreements. This should help to assure that
the defendant is personally familiar with all discussions and agree-
ments conducted between defense counsel and prosecutor.' 125 Both
the federal rules of criminal procedure 126 and the uniform rules of
120. Id.
121. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.4(a)(v) commentary.
122. Id.
123. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244.
124. Brady, 397 at 755.
125. ABA STANDARs § 14-1.5 history of standard.
126. YED. R. CRiM. P. 11(d). (e)(2).
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criminal procedure17 require that the court assess voluntariness by
determining the content of prior plea discussions, and whether any
force of threats were used to obtain the plea.
The recommended practice, therefore, is for the court to in-
quire whether the plea is the result of a plea bargain. If it is, the
court should examine any documents setting forth the terms of the
plea agreement and have defense counsel, prosecution, and defen-
dant testify as to the discussions held, the terms and conditions of
the plea agreement, and the reasons for it. The court should ask
the defendant if this represents all the terms of the agreement.
The court should then inform the defendant whether or not it con-
curs in the plea agreement. The court should inform the defendant
that it is not bound by the agreement. It should further advise the
defendant that if it later decides that the final disposition should
not include the charge or sentence concessions, the defendant may
affirm or withdraw his plea of guilty."'
The court should, at this point, give the defendant an oppor-
tunity to ask any questions regarding the proceedings. This will
allow the defendant to reconsider his plea. The court should ask
whether any person has promised anything other than the terms of
plea agreement and whether any person has threatened, forced, or
intimidated the defendant into entering the guilty plea.
H. Other Recommendations
After the court initially determines that the defendant wishes
to plead, the defendant should be sworn in. Having the defendant
sworn adds a measure of solemnity to the colloquy, and may also
discourage later repudiations.12 '
Yes/no responses should be avoided.1 0 The term "colloquy"
aptly expresses the nature of the interchange. It should represent a
two-party exchange of information and understandings. As the
comment to the ABA Standards states, "where the defendant does
nothing more than state that he or she understands the advise-
ments, there may occasionally be doubts by the court as to
127. UNIFORM RuLEs OF CmMmAL PROCEDURE 444(b)(2) (1974).
128. See State v. Hendricks, - Mont. -, - P.2d - (1984).
129. See 8 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.01(4)
(2d ed. 1976).
130. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.6(b) commentary provides:
[T]he court must make certain that the defendant's statements are sufficiently
detailed so as to establish factual guilt; the questions asked of the defendant,
therefore, should call for responses in the defendant's own words. If the defendant
simply answers yes or no to the court's inquiries, there may later be dispute as to
the presence of factual guilt.
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whether the defendant truly comprehends the rights men-
tioned."' 31 Wherever doubt exists, the court should have the defen-
dant repeat information or understanding as to rights in his or her
own words.
The suggested "standard" colloquy attached to this comment
as an appendix is intended only as a "skeletal" inquiry. It is in-
tended to be used as a starting point upon which the court should
expand depending on the particular defendant and the factual sit-
uation presented to the court. It is not intended to be a substitute
for the discretionary power of the court to question more fully
where the court determines that such an inquiry is necessary.132
There should be express questioning by the court whether the
accused has had sufficient time for deliberation with counsel.133
The court should also inquire whether the accused is satisfied with
counsel's services.
Under Montana law it is the duty of defense counsel to inform
the defendant about possible defenses and mitigating factors. 34
After listening to the factual basis for the plea, the court is in an
excellent position to note any possible defenses that might be as-
serted. An affirmative inquiry should be made into whether possi-
ble defenses were discussed with the defendant. Such a record pre-
cludes a later contention that such matters were not discussed.
Where defenses and mitigating circumstances are discussed on the
record, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel as to these
matters are easily disposed of should they later be raised on
appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Strong policy arguments support a guilty plea inquiry that
goes beyond what the courts have held to be constitutionally re-
quired. Montana courts should adopt a standard inquiry that more
fully complies with the spirit of the Boykin directive.'3 5 The adop-
tion of a standard inquiry will allow equal information for all crim-
inal defendants, prevent a substantial number of appeals, and en-
hance the integrity of the entire criminal justice system.
131. Id. § 14-1.4(b) commentary.
132. As Judge Rosenblatt states in the introduction to his suggested inquiry, the sug-
gested colloquy is not a "catechism." It is not intended as a substitute for the judicial exer-
cise of discretion on a case-by-case basis. Rosenblatt, The Guilty Plea Colloquy, Annotated
(Mar. 1978) (unpublished article).
133. ABA STANDARDS § 14-1.3.
134. State v. Day, - Mont. -, 635 P.2d 568 (1981).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
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The ABA Standards present a comprehensive, well-researched
source as to what the defendant ought to be informed of at the
entry of a guilty plea. The Montana Supreme Court, pursuant to
its supervisory powers, 36 should direct a judicial commission, com-
posed of members of all the judicial districts, to propose a stan-
dard colloquy to be adopted by supreme court rule. The ABA
Standards and other model provisions provide the necessary
framework for such an inquiry. The commission's task would con-
sist of adapting provisions such as these to the requirements of
Montana law. The standard colloquy adopted by supreme court
rule should be incorporated into the judge's desk book, for ease of
reference and accessibility.
Only by adoption of such a comprehensive standard colloquy
will every criminal defendant be assured of the "utmost solicitude"
mandated by the Supreme Court in Boykin. A number of inequi-
ties inherent in the criminal justice system cannot be corrected be-
cause of the nature of the system itself-e.g. the unequal experi-
ence and ability of opposing counsel. Equal information at entry of
a guilty plea, however, is easily accomplished. Where equality is so
easily obtained, the criminal justice system should take action to
obtain it.
"Equal justice for all" should mean equal information for all
persons criminally accused.
136. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-112 (1983).
[Vol. 45
22
Montana Law Review, Vol. 45 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/6
GUILTY PLEA COLLOQUIES
APPENDIX
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT TO ASK IN TAKING A
GUILTY PLEA
Acknowledgments: The author drew heavily from the following
sources in formulating the suggested colloquy and wishes to ac-
knowledge and thank the authors of those sources:
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 14-Pleas of
Guilty, appendix (2d ed. 1980).
Montana Prosecutor, February 1978, Volume 2, No. 2 (available
upon request from the Montana Attorney General's Office, Spe-
cial Prosecutors Services).
A.M. Rosenblatt, The Guilty Plea Colloquy, Annotated (March
1978) (unpublished article).
QUESTIONS BY THE COURT
[Note: Any defendant appearing without counsel should be in-
formed of the right to counsel, and that if he is without means to
employ counsel, counsel will be provided. The court should not
accept a guilty plea without valid waiver of the right. The record
should be especially thorough and comprehensive where the de-
fendant waives the right to counsel.]
Court: (To Defense Counsel) What is the position of the
defendant?
Court: (To Defendant) Before the court can accept your plea of
guilty, it must determine that it is freely and voluntarily made by
you. The court must also be satisfied that you know what you are
doing. For this reason, I will be asking you certain questions. If you
do not understand the questions or words that I use, or desire a
further explanation, do not hesitate to stop me and tell me so.
Court: Do you have a copy of the indictment, information or
complaint?
Court: I suggest that you hold a copy of the charge(s) in your hand
so that you may refer to them readily during this hearing. Your
plea will not be accepted unless you realize that by your plea you
admit every act or omission and every element with respect to the
offense to which you plead guilty, and that you are pleading guilty
because you really are guilty. If you are not convinced that you are
in fact guilty, you should not allow any other consideration to in-
fluence you to plead guilty.
Court: Under Montana law, all persons are bailable before convic-
tion, except when death is a possible punishment for the offense
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charged and the proof is evident or the presumption great that the
defendant is guilty of the offense charged. A guilty plea constitutes
a conviction, and therefore, bail is not available as a matter of
right, subsequent to the entry of the plea. (To Defense Counsel)
Has bail been discussed with the defendant?
Court: Is it correct, (Defendant), that as your attorney said, you
want to plead guilty to [offenses Defendant is pleading guilty to]?
(Have the Defendant sworn in. Remind the Defendant of the pen-
alties for perjury.)
Court: What is your full name and address? Is this your true
name?
Court: How old are you? (If Defendant is under 21, inquire about
Defendant's parents and their location. If parents are present,
make sure they state their names and addresses for the record. In
addition, ask if the Defendant has discussed the decision to enter a
plea of guilty with his or her parents.)
Court: How much education do you have?
Court: Can you read and write English? (If there is any suggestion
of a language barrier, the court should appoint an interpreter.)
Court: What kind of work or occupation have you engaged in dur-
ing your lifetime?
Court: Are you currently under the care of a physician for any
reason?
Court: Have you ever been or are you now under the care of a psy-
chiatrist or psychologist? Have you ever been treated for any
mental illness? (If so, find out what type of mental illness the De-
fendant has been or is being treated for and obtain statements
from the Defendant and Defense Counsel that there is no question
concerning competency at this time.)
Court: Have you ever been treated or confined for narcotic or drug
addiction?
Court: Do you feel in good physical and mental health as you stand
here today?
Court: Have you taken any drugs or alcoholic beverages within the
last 24 hours?
Court: Do you feel that you have had ample time to consult with
your attorney before deciding to plead guilty?
Court: Are you satisfied with the services of your attorney?
Court: I am going to read the [indictment, information or com-
plaint] to you so that you will understand the offense[s] charged.
(Court reads the charging instrument. Defendant or Defense Coun-
sel may waive reading of the same.)
Court: If you choose to go to trial rather than enter a plea of guilty
[Vol. 45
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you could be found guilty of these lesser included offenses: (Ex-
plain any applicable lesser-included offenses.)
Court: Do you understand the nature of the charges brought
against you?
Court: You have the right to remain silent at a trial. But by plead-
ing guilty you waive that right. Before accepting your plea, I must
be satisfied that you in fact committed the offense[s] charged. Do
you wish to waive the right to remain silent?
Court: Is this what you did? (Again, briefly paraphrase the
charge[s].)
Court: Explain in your own words what you did.
[Note: If the Defendant wishes to enter an Alford plea, i.e., enter-
ing a guilty plea while maintaining his innocence, the following
questions should be asked:
Court: Do I understand correctly that you want to plead guilty
but you will give no factual account of guilty conduct?
Court: Please explain why you are pleading guilty, because the
court is not disposed to accept the plea unless it is satisfied that
you are doing this after great reflection and for sound reasons.]
Court: The court wants to advise you that under the law you could
be sentenced to a maximum of years in prison; or, alterna-
tively the court in its discretion may sentence you to a lesser term;
or the court may place you on probation. (Also explain the
mandatory minimum sentence, if any, and the following special
circumstances that may affect defendant's probation or release
from incarceration:
a). additional two to ten (2-10) years imposed for armed of-
fenses; four to twenty (4-20) years if second armed conviction;
b). additional sentences for armed offenses to run
consecutively;
c). that if the defendant is convicted of a second deliberate
homicide he will, if sufficient mitigating circumstances are not
found, be sentenced to death;
d). possibility of being ineligible for parole or participation in
prison furlough programs;
e). possible designation as dangerous or nondangerous of-
fender, with difference of serving either one-half or one-quarter of
the sentence term, less good time.)
Court: Does the State intend to seek treatment of the Defendant
as a persistent felony offender? (The Defendant should be in-
formed that if he is designated a persistent felony offender, he
must be imprisoned for at least five years.)
Court: (Defendant), by pleading guilty you are "waiving"-and by
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"waiving" I mean "giving up"-several guarantees set forth in the
Constitution. You have a right to a speedy and public trial, and
this includes the right to a trial by jury. You also have the right to
insist that the State establish your guilt of the offense at trial be-
yond a reasonable doubt. If a trial were to be held, you would have
a right to testify. Also, if there were a trial, you would have a right
to hear from the witnesses who claim that you committed (the of-
fense charged). And, if there were a trial, you would be able to
present witnesses of your own and to compel by the use of subpoe-
nas the attendance at trial of these witnesses. Do you understand
that by pleading guilty you are giving up all of these rights?
Court: (If written acknowledgment of waiver of rights has been
filed, the court should say:) The court has before it a document
entitled "Written Acknowledgment of Waiver of Rights." Do you
have a copy of this agreement?
Court: Did you sign it?
Court: Did you read it before you signed it?
Court: Do you understand the information set forth on that
agreement?
Court: Do you have any questions about any of the terms con-
tained in the agreement?
Court: Do you also understand that by pleading guilty you are giv-
ing up the right to object to the sufficiency of the papers charging
you with [the offenses charged]? Do you also understand that by
pleading guilty you are giving up the right to object to any evi-
dence that may have been obtained in violation of your constitu-
tional rights?
Court: Are you satisfied that you would prefer to plead guilty
rather than raise any possible defenses?
Court: (To Defense Counsel) Have you discussed possible defenses
with the Defendant?
Court: (To Defense Counsel) What defenses have you discussed
with the Defendant?
Court: Are you (Defendant) convinced that you prefer to plead
guilty rather than proceed to trial?
Court: Is the plea of guilty which you are offering to enter the re-
sult of a plea agreement that was arrived at between your attorney
and the prosecutor? (Require Defense Counsel and Prosecutor to
reply also.)
Court: (To Defense Counsel and Prosecutor) Are there any docu-
ments which set forth the terms of the agreement and which
should be considered by the court?
Court: Since a plea agreement has been reached, I would like to
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request that the attorneys for the prosecution and defense disclose
to me at this time what discussions were held, the terms and con-
ditions of the plea agreement, and the reasons for it.
Court: [Defendant], is this your understanding of the plea
agreement?
Court: Does this comprise all the terms of the plea agreement, as
you understand them?
Court: The terms of the plea agreement are not binding on this'
court. That is, the court can later refuse to grant sentence [and/or
charge] reductions set forth in the plea agreement that have been
agreed upon between your attorney and the Prosecutor. Do you
understand that?
Court: Are there any questions you want to ask about the conse-
quences or implications of your guilty plea? Or about any proceed-
ings here?
Court: Has any person promised or suggested to you that you will
be rewarded in any manner other than the terms of the plea
agreement?
Court: Has any person used any threats, force, pressure, or intimi-
dation to make you enter this plea of guilty?
Court: Are you entering this plea voluntarily and of your own free
will?
Court: Has anyone-and I include the court, the County Attorney,
your attorney, the police, or anyone else-threatened you or co-
erced you or in any way influenced you against your own free will
in order to get you to plead guilty?
Court: Is there anything which you have said that is not true or
which you now want to retract?
Court: Do you wish to reaffirm everything that you have said?
Court: The court finds that you, [Defendant], understand the na-
ture of the offense and the consequences of your plea, and there is
a factual basis for the plea, and that your decision to plead guilty
has been made voluntarily of your own free will and accord.
Court: The plea of guilty is accepted.
Court: [Defendant], you are advised that you may request a with-
drawal of the plea at any time before sentencing is announced, and
if you have any sound reason for it, I will grant your request.
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